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Introduction 
The 1970s in Italy were characterised by the persistence and prolongation of political 
and social unrest that many Western countries experienced during the late 1960s. The decade 
saw the multiplication of far-left extra-parliamentary organisations, the presence of a militant 
far-right movement, and a crescendo in the use of politically motivated violence and state 
repressive measures (Della Porta, 1984; Della Porta e Pasquino, 1983; Lumley, 1990; 
Sommier, 1998; Tarrow, 1998). The increasing militarisation and use of political violence, 
from sabotage and damage to property, to kidnappings and targeted assassinations, were 
justified by left-wing groups both as necessary means to achieve a revolutionary project and as 
defence against the threat of a neo-fascist coup (Sommier, 1998; 2008). Violence from far-
right militants also took different forms, including bombings in public places that made dozens 
of victims: Piazza Fontana in Milan in 1969, Piazza della Loggia in Brescia in 1974, on the 
train Italicus in 1974 and at Bologna train station in 1980 (Catanzaro, 1990; Della Porta, 1984). 
The state’s responses were largely repressive, with the fast-paced adoption of emergency 
legislation and exceptional measures, particularly between 1978 and 1982 (Cento Bull and 
Cooke, 2013; Author, 2011; Schimel, 1986), that led to mass arrests of political activists and 
sympathisers. 
Threats against the state in post-war Italy have largely been dealt with a punitive 
approach based on penal repression (Gallo, 2015; Nelken, 2005; Pavarini, 1994; Violante, 
1997). However, mechanisms of leniency have often tempered the ‘punitive potential’ (Gallo, 
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2015) of the criminal law and penal code inherited from Fascism, with amnesties and pardons 
being frequently used in the aftermath of social and political unrest, as well as routinized tools 
of penal management for common offences. In the case of the 1970s, however, no measure of 
this kind was passed, and forms of relative clemency were limited, selective and individualised. 
 This paper endeavours to explain why attempts to grant an amnesty for politically 
motivated offences committed during the 1970s failed, by reintroducing the penal dimension 
of the debates, often overlooked in studies on the issue. It posits that the withholding of the 
amnesty over the years resulted not only from the long-lasting firm position of the Italian state 
(fermezza dello stato) towards the 1970s’ armed struggle and the refusal to acknowledge its 
political and collective significance, but also from changing attitudes, discourses and practices 
about punishment, justice and victims that have re-shaped the controversies of the past through 
the lenses of the present. Based on the study of draft bills, bills ad acts concerning clemency 
measures and relevant parliamentary discussions, this paper aims to historicise the political 
debates on amnesty and pardon since the 1980s, to show how they have been contextually 
constructed, and invites to think and problematize the discontinuities in the public and political 
discourses about clemency and punishment.  
Previous analyses have privileged the political angle to explain the absence of an 
amnesty after the 1970s, by focusing on political oppositions and definitional struggles of the 
political violence. Rayner (2006) underlined how the issue of amnesty was particularly 
contentious because debates were inscribed in a multiplicity of fields, professional logics, 
interests and discourses that shaped actors’ anticipations and perceptions of ‘what is possible 
(or not)’, thus operating as ‘crossed vetoes’. Nubola (2011) highlighted that discussions about 
amnesty inevitably imply political and historical evaluations, while Dematteo (2006) and 
Wahnich (2006) emphasised the lasting controversies and political struggles over divergent 
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historical interpretations of the 1970s1 and a fortiori ‘over the ways to make these 
interpretations available or not on the public space’ (Wahnich, 2007: 92).  
While building on the studies above, this paper argues that to fully understand the penal 
treatment of militants convicted for politically motivated offences during the 1970s, it is 
necessary to re-inscribe the debates on clemency also in the field of penality and understand 
how they have been shaped by changing judicial practices and penal policies, as much as by 
deep-rooted political considerations and divides. It takes this structuring tension between the 
criminal and the political as the main prism to analyse variations and continuities over time. 
The ‘years of lead’, as they are commonly referred to, cannot be easily qualified either as war 
or as peace (Linhardt and Moreau de Bellaing, 2013) and this in-betweenness has impacted the 
ways in which political violence has been dealt with, or rather the reasons for which its legacy 
remains still largely unresolved. The ‘armed struggle’ has been primarily framed as a criminal 
issue, as the state has resorted to criminal justice (CJ) tools and delegated the resolution of the 
crisis to the ordinary judiciary (Canosa & Santosuosso, 1982: 22; Fiorentino & Chiaramonte, 
2019: 158). This resulted in harsh sentences and detention conditions for individual 
perpetrators, and a fortiori the de-politicisation and individualisation of acts borne out of a 
specific political and social context. But it also created the conditions for prolonging the 
polemics about the state’s responsibilities, collective and political dimension of the ‘armed 
struggle’ and demands for political tools of pacification, such amnesty, pardon, truth and 
reconciliation commissions. This article argues that the absence of amnesty (but the reiteration 
of its possibility over time) and the judicialisation of 1970s’ politically motivated crimes have 
led to the perpetuation of debates on this period of Italian history, by making it a topic of 
incessant political and judicial controversy and object of political instrumentalisation.  
The socio-historical analysis of those debates allows to observe the progressive 
delegitimation of amnesty and pardon as tools to address the penal and political legacies of the 
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1970s and resituate it in a wider changing landscape of penal discourses and practices in a more 
punitive direction in Italy since the early 1990s (Corda, 2016). The 1980s and 1990s were 
decades of profound transformation of Italian society: political corruption scandals and the end 
of the Cold War accelerated the restructuring of the political field, with the arrival of new 
populist parties with a neoliberal orientation, and the decline of traditional political forces; 
more market-oriented economic policies promoted liberalisations, privatisations and the de-
structuring of the labour market; finally, the figure of the judge gained a new social (and 
political) legitimacy.  
These changes had long-term repercussions on Italian penality. Since the 1990s penal 
policies and public discourses on crime and punishment have been increasingly framed in terms 
of retributivism, individual responsibility, and dismissal of social and political causes (Corda, 
2016; Fiandaca, 2013; Pavarini, 1994; 2013; Selmini, 2011; Wacquant, 1999), whilst crime 
and crime control have become objects of electoral contest. This resulted in the expansion of 
the realm of the penal, growth of the incarceration rate and emergence of a new punitive doxa, 
similarly to what observed in other Western countries (Fassin, 2017; Garland, 2001; Pratt, 
2007; Pratt et al., 2005; Selmini, 2011; Simon, 2007; Wacquant, 2009). These trends have 
nevertheless coexisted in Italy with structural and contingent factors (Corda, 2016) and 
periodic instances of ‘pragmatic moderation’ (Gallo, 2018) that partly contained them. Thus, 
the study of the debates on clemency for 1970s’ politically motivated crimes, constitutes an 
observatory on how punitive trends are translated and complexified locally, in specific 
circumstances and in resonance with cultural and historical traditions (Melossi, 2001). 
By focusing on a specific case, and articulating literature on penality, political 
transformations and transitional justice, this paper therefore contributes to academic debates 
on punitiveness and processes of judicialisation and criminalisation of the past. It invites an 
analysis of punishment (or its suspension) as a contended area of action and representation of 
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social phenomena and historical events where the political and the criminal inevitably 
entangled.  
The article is organised in two parts that historically and chronologically retrace the 
unfolding of political debates in Italy about amnesty and pardon for offences committed during 
the 1970s. The first part examines the first phase and state’s responses to political violence 
from the mid-1970s to the early debates on clemency measures, in the immediate aftermath of 
the ‘end of terrorism’ (early 1980s). The second part analyses the second (late 1980s-early 
1990) and third phases (late 1990s-2000s). In the former, proposals for amnesty and pardon 
progressively lose support in a context of political uncertainty, growing judicialisation of 
politics and rise of penal populism. The latter is characterised by the disappearance of proposals 
for clemency and increasing political uses of the 1970s, in a context characterised by a populist 
approach to crime, ‘security’, punishment and their pervasive presence in political campaigns. 
The end of the armed struggle: between punitiveness and clemency 
Amnesty and indulto are important mechanisms in the Italian constitution (art. 79) 
written in the transition from the fascist regime to democracy in 1946-1948. In the legal 
doctrine, they are defined as means to achieve national reconciliation and social pacification. 
Indulto is a form of collective pardon, remitting part or the entirety of a penalty, while amnesty 
involves a collective cancellation of the offence, cessation of the penalty and may involve 
protection from prosecution (art. 151 and 174 c.p.). Historically, in Italy, amnesty was created 
as a tool of pardon for political acts, in the context of the 19th century workers’ movements 
and, despite the routinisation of its use over time, it has long been associated with political 
crimes (Santosuosso and Colao, 1986). Whilst ‘Togliatti’s amnesty’ used for national 
reconciliation in the transition from Fascism to democracy in 1946 remained the reference par 
excellence, five amnesties were passed following social movements and periods of political 
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unrest in the 1950s-60s and another one in 1970, after the wave of students’ and workers’ 
protests 1968-69 (Colao, 2011; Santosuosso and Colao, 1986). Similarly, the amnesty 
discussed in Italy about the ‘years of lead’ could be defined as ‘a sovereign act of forgiveness 
for past acts, granted by a government to all persons (or to certain classes of persons) who have 
been guilty of crime or delict, generally political offences – treason, sedition, rebellion, draft 
evasion – and often conditioned upon their return to obedience and duty within a prescribed 
time’ (Garner and Black, 1992: 82-83) 
State’s responses, from ‘public order’ to counter-terrorism 
During the 1970s, Italian institutions dealt with the widespread use of violence by 
militant groups by resorting to ‘normal’ –routinized practices and pre-existing legislative 
tools—, as well as ‘exceptional’ means of CJ, such as new laws and investigation practices 
elaborated ad hoc to address the circumstances. Until 1975, a series of ‘public order’ acts were 
passed, that toughened the legislation especially relating to preventive incarceration and 
recidivism, and widened discretionary powers of the police and judges. Particularly repressive, 
the ‘Reale Law’ (152/1975) also introduced the distinction between common and ‘political 
criminality’, to subject the latter to a more punitive scope. Following the increasing use of 
firearms and specifically after the kidnapping of Aldo Moro, leader of the Christian Democracy 
party (DC)2 in 1978 by the Red Brigades (BR), the notion of ‘political criminality’ was replaced 
and redefined in the legislation and public sphere by that of ‘terrorism’. Between 1978 and 
1981, emergency laws (leggi d’emergenza) and counter-terrorism measures were adopted at a 
speedy pace, often as decree laws3. These granted larger powers to police forces and 
investigating judges, introduced aggravations for offences committed with political aims and 
for ‘subversive association’, extended the terms of preventive incarceration, remand and 
minimum sentences for politically motivated offences and offences committed to further the 
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aims of political organizations. (Author, 2011; Schimel, 1986). The early 1980s were 
characterised by the appearance of the first pentiti (justice collaborators), waves of arrests and 
trials, and the incarceration of several hundreds of radical left activists, many of whom 
sentenced to very long terms (22 years and over). According to data available (Curcio, 1994), 
4087 activists were detained at the beginning of the 1980s, in prisons around the country, 
including a few hundred in maximum security facilities4.  
The crescendo of punitive legislation since 1975, specifically targeting political 
activism, was deployed across all stages of the criminal justice process, from investigation 
processes to detention conditions. Highly controversial from the outset, emergency laws were 
denounced by many left-wing politicians and lawyers as ‘undemocratic’, for infringing the rule 
of law and constitutional guarantees, and restricting political and civil liberties. They also 
testified, ‘intentionally or by omission, to a delegation to judges of the monopoly of the 
resolution’ of the conflict (Violante, 1997: XIX) that had significant long-term impacts 
(Author, 2011). Firstly, it contributed to the emergence of a new figure of the judge with 
increased ‘political weight and social credibility’ (Violante, 1997: XIX; see also Fiandaca, 
2013; Vauchez, 2004): judges came to embody simultaneously the authority of the expert on 
the phenomenon of the armed struggle; that of guardian of the democratic state in contrast to 
the inability or unwillingness of political actors to solve the crisis; and that of the heroic victim 
that is sacrificed for the common good5. The affirmation of an (un)contested expertise of judges 
on the ‘truth’ about the 1970s, that focused on its criminal dimensions, has tended to exclude 
competing (non-judicial) accounts6, and led to a durable framing of political violence as a 
criminal phenomenon, necessitating a CJ response to identify and punish individual 
perpetrators, rather than political intervention. Finally, the reliance upon criminal justice and 
emergency legislation has also generated a new punitive drive in criminal law and the 
development of new judicial practices7, cultures and approaches, that persisted beyond the 
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‘year of lead’ (Corda, 2016; Fiorentino & Chiaramonte, 2019; Della Porta, 2001; Vauchez, 
2004).  
The study of debates within the Parliament, the judiciary and in the national press 
during the 1980s shows that discourses in favour or against clemency in this first phase were 
shaped by simultaneous judicial, political and historical arguments. Discussions were taking 
place in different social fields and reflected their different values, interests and form of 
expertise: firstly, the evaluation of ‘terrorism’ as an ongoing or a bygone threat and the 
effectiveness of ‘emergency legislation’ (mainly in the judicial field); secondly, the 
anticipation of the public (un)acceptability of such measure (especially in the political field); 
finally, the historical interpretation of the 1970s’ political violence and the role of the state. 
Political prisoners themselves were divided on the issue of clemency, their positions reflecting 
their personal and political evaluations of past engagements, but also persistent political 
rivalries.  
If attempts to reverse the over-criminalisation (and over-penalisation) of political 
crimes fail in this first phase, it is not so much because of a punitive consensus, but rather 
because of the collusion of multiple rationalities and diverging interests.  
Dissociation or amnesty: hostilities and divides behind bars 
The imprisonment of political activists in high numbers posed a series of challenges to 
the prison system in the early 1980s: internally, it saw protests and broader politicization of 
inmates; externally, it was criticised for the conditions of detention and mass imprisonment of 
militants. These circumstances encouraged the emergence of demands, from both inside and 
outside custodial institutions, for a ‘political solution’ to close the season of political violence, 
unveil the ‘truth’ about the ‘years of lead’, including the role of state actors and agencies in 
sustaining far right violence, and to exit the logic of the emergency.  
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The first calls for an amnesty appeared in 19798, in the aftermath of the ‘7th April’ case, a mass 
arrest9 of activists and intellectuals from the leftist decentralised movement of Autonomia 
Operaia, including Toni Negri10. The publication of a text entitled Terrorismo? Nein danke11, 
by Negri, triggered discussions that profoundly divided political prisoners on the significance 
of the armed struggle and whether to negotiate (or not) with the state12. The movement of 
‘dissociation’, by which some detained militants publicly distanced themselves from their 
previous engagements and renounced violence as a means of political struggle, was translated 
into parliamentary debates that resulted in the adoption of the law on dissociation in 1987. The 
law allowed individual prisoners to benefit from sentence remissions and detention 
arrangements if they admitted their personal responsibilities in criminal acts, repudiated 
violence and disengaged from their political organisation, as demonstrated by their conduct 
and declarations13. 
Militants in prisons progressively polarised into opposing lines, according to their 
position in favour of or against ‘dissociation’ and/or amnesty. The main contentious aspect 
between dissociation and amnesty, was that the former required from detainees a disavowal 
and condemnation of their former political engagements and involved an individualised penal 
process, assessed case-by-case. Amnesty, on the other hand, would constitute a collective 
measure applicable to categories of offences, independently from the conduct, beliefs and 
declarations of the individual after their arrest. Advocates of amnesty therefore perceived it as 
a measure that would preserve and recognise the political and collective significance of the 
armed struggle. On the contrary, the process of dissociation was sustaining the 
individualisation of political and criminal responsibilities for acts that were conceived and 
committed as collectively, thus distorting their meaning and reinforcing the dominant judicial 
narrative of the 1970s violence as a series of individual acts rather than a collective revolt. 
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Nevertheless, it was not until the mid/late 1980s that several political prisoners, mainly ex 
members of the Red Brigades, officially positioned themselves against dissociation and 
launched a campaign in favour of ‘one political solution for all’. 
From prisons to parliament and the judiciary: political controversies and professional logics 
In the early 1980s, some left-wing members of the Italian Parliament (MIP) and 
lawyers14 publicly supported clemency measures and presented bills to Parliament to repeal 
the ‘emergency legislation’, revoke the aggravations it introduced for crimes committed with 
political aims and close the season of political violence. The study of parliamentary debates on 
these bills shows that the DC, majority party, was overall strongly opposed to clemency 
measures, with the exception of Francesco Cossiga, former Minister of the Interior during the 
years 1976-7815, who was also one of the rare politicians agreeing with the definition of the 
1970s as ‘low intensity civil war’.16 The position of the Communist Party (PCI) was much 
more ambivalent, with some representatives agreeing in principle with an amnesty but 
believing that ‘time was not ripe’, and many others preferring selective clemency measures 
like dissociation and reforms of the penal system. In this period, the PCI was involved in 
elaborating a reform of the prison system that introduced gradual decarceration mechanisms 
based on the observation and evaluation of individual prisoners’ conduct. The law was adopted 
in 1986 and commonly referred to as the ‘Gozzini law’.17 The Italian Socialist Party (PSI) was 
overall the most favourable, among major parties, to measures of clemency, including a general 
amnesty.  
The first and most comprehensive bill of amnesty and pardon for ‘offences committed 
with terrorist aims’18 was presented by the radical left party Democrazia Proletaria (DP) in 
1985. Its promoters emphasised the ‘deep damages to the penal system and the democratic 
fabric’ caused by the counter-terrorism legislation, the necessity ‘to counterbalance the level 
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of “over-penalisation” and call the state ‘to act with equity to rectify the injustices that resulted 
from the emergency trials’19. This proposal was never examined in parliament, but the 
possibility of including political crimes was discussed as part of an amnesty bill for ordinary 
crimes, presented the following year by some socialist MIPs20. However, diverging and 
irreconcilable positions appeared about the categories of political offences that were to be 
included or excluded and the scope of the law finally passed in December 1986 was very 
limited and excluded offences for which most political activists were sentenced. The analysis 
of these debates evinces that despite a relative convergence on the necessity of ‘exiting the 
emergency’, political forces, with few exceptions, lacked the political willingness to back 
collective measures of clemency, justified by the fear that ‘terrorism’ was not yet ended and 
the public was not ready to accept clemency. 
In a similar way, but responding to different professional logics and interests, the issue 
of clemency divided the judiciary. Counter-terrorism practices and emergency legislation had 
already polarised judges and lawyers, around the interpretation of constitutional guarantees, 
protection of civil and political rights and the (un)democratic character of emergency laws 
adopted in the late 1970s. Some judges from the left-wing union Magistratura Democratica 
backed a measure of general amnesty over dissociation as early as 198321 as a way to abandon 
the ‘culture of emergency’ (Santosuosso, 1984). The vast majority of the judiciary were 
nevertheless against any form of collective clemency, and more favourable to individual and 
gradual measures of decarceration as outlined in the dissociation or Gozzini laws. Arguments 
against a general amnesty were based upon the fear of resurgence of political violence, but also 
on the definitional controversies on the armed struggle as a political or a criminal/terrorist 
phenomenon: as Grevi (1984: 72), lawyer and advisor to the government in 1978, put it, 
‘measures of this kind would recall too closely situations similar to the end of a civil war – and 
therefore they would contribute to attribute, de facto, to their beneficiaries a status that does 
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not correspond to the reality of our terrorism’. 
Vigorous hostility to any form of clemency, including dissociation, came from those 
judges who specialised in counter-terrorism and led the investigations against armed groups. 
In 1984, thirty-six judges addressed a letter to three key state institutions warning against the 
still present ‘terrorist threat’, emphasising the dangers of sentence remissions schemes that did 
not require from the defendant an active cooperation with the investigations, and of premature 
abandonment of the emergency legislation22. Clemency measures were not only perceived by 
these judges as a delegitimisation and dissolution of their professional work and personal 
sacrifice (Vauchez, 2004) in a period when they were gaining an unprecedented social 
legitimacy, but also as a potential dispossession of tools developed against the armed struggle, 
and that they were re-adapting to investigate Mafia organisations. 
More symbolically, the contended ground for competency and action between the 
political and the judicial was at stake, in a period of redefinition of power relations between 
institutions. Dissociation and the Gozzini law offered forms of selective leniency that would 
keep the control of the penal treatment of political prisoners within the judiciary, and therefore 
not defy the judicial monopoly of the definitions of the means, criteria and values to apply in 
dealing with political crimes. Conversely, an amnesty – as a political act that intervenes to 
modify or nullify a judicial decision – would have de-criminalised the issue and brought it back 
to the political realm, its different logic and interests. 
The law on dissociation was formally enacted in 1987 as a measure of individual and 
selective pardon. Though very contentious, it drew enough support within the institutions, for 
at least three reasons. Firstly, it did not involve a collective pardon, as applications were 
evaluated case by case and was therefore consistent with the principle of individualisation of 
penal responsibilities. Secondly, it was a scheme of selective sentence reduction, that was 
perceived as less politically costly, because granted only to ‘deserving’ prisoners, who had 
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repudiated violence and shown regret for their actions. Finally, because it required from 
detainees to demonstrate this renouncement with their conducts and public declarations, it also 
constituted a powerful means of re-legitimation of liberal democracy and the state itself, similar 
to processes of abjuration before the Inquisition (Sommier, 2000). The main critiques to the 
law and its effects pointed to the fact that it was rooted in the understanding of responsibility 
in penal, individual and subjective terms, therefore reducing the historical interpretation of 
complex political and social phenomenon to a sum of individual criminal acts. From a legal 
perspective, the law on dissociation was criticised for failing to abandon the culture of the 
‘emergency’ and ‘exception’ and on the contrary protracting it, by establishing the 
differentiation of detained militants on the grounds of their procedural conducts rather than on 
the acts they were sentenced for (Ferrajoli, 1987). The re-categorisation of detained militants 
according to their public declaration or silences, subsequently contributed to over-criminalise 
those militants who chose, for ethical, personal or political reasons, not to declare themselves 
as ‘dissociated’ (Cesoni, 1983). An amnesty law, on the other hand, carried the potential to 
resignify the events, by symbolically reinstating the collective and political significance of acts 
of violence in their historical circumstances and therefore include the ‘years of lead’ in the 
political history of the country, rather than in its criminal history (Wahnich, 2007). 
As will be shown in the following section, draft bills and bills of amnesty laws including 
politically motivated crimes committed during the 1970s continued to be presented before the 
Italian Parliament until the years 2000s. Yet, the actual prospect of an amnesty started to fade 






The foreclosing horizon of the amnesty 
The last extensive political and public debate on a general amnesty for the ‘years of 
lead’ took place in 1987-88, following the declarations by Renato Curcio23 and other non-
dissociated Red Brigade militants, affirming that the ‘armed experience’ was over and it was 
time to open to a discussion about its social roots (Curcio et al., 1987). In this phase of the late 
1980s-early 1990s, only very sporadic crimes were still committed by decimated left militant 
groups; the general context was changing and prefiguring significant transformations at 
national and international level. The end of the Cold War had implications for global 
geopolitics, but also influenced the national political field, entailing the redefinition of the 
identity of mass parties like the PCI in a more social-democratic direction24. At national level, 
the context was characterised by the resurgence of mafia violence and by the landmark political 
corruption scandal Clean Hands (Mani Pulite) in 1991-92. The scandal led to a dramatic 
restructuring of the Italian political field (Briquet, 1995; Nelken, 1996; Vannucci, 2016) 25: 
traditional mass parties like the DC and post-war parties, declined or even disappeared, while 
new right-wing parties entered the field, like the neoliberal Forza Italia (FI)26, or gained a new 
legitimacy, like the nationalistic National Alliance (AN)27 or the populist and xenophobic 
Northern League28. 
A changing context: the delegitimation of clemency and the depoliticisation of the crime 
problem 
Following the declarations of detained BR militants, a proposal for collective pardon 
applicable to ‘sentences for crimes committed with terrorist aims’, was presented by MIPs of 
various left-wing parties in 1989.29 Parliamentary debates indicate the existence of a consensus 
upon the ‘end of terrorism’ and ‘a diffuse process of re-socialisation of those sentenced for 
terrorism’30. Political forces also widely agreed on envisaging clemency as a tool ‘to restore 
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the penal and procedural equality that was weakened by the legislation of the “years of lead”’31, 
in conformity with ‘juridical principles to abandon the inconsistencies and distortions of 
judicial practices of the emergency’32 and alleviate their effects on those sentenced under this 
framework33. Supporters of the bill particularly emphasised that it was not motivated by a 
careless attitude of forgiveness (perdonismo) or ‘a flexible and pietistic conception of 
punishment’, nor by the will to ‘forget terrorism’, but on the contrary, by the necessity of re-
establishing the ‘rigorous application of the principle of proportionality’34. Thus, the debates 
were structured almost exclusively around juridical and penal considerations, while the more 
traditional political and social justifications of clemency– such as re-habilitation and social 
pacification – were only marginally raised. The de-politicisation of clemency for political 
prisoners and its reduction to a technical question of penal rigour, suggests a more paradigmatic 
loss of legitimacy of the political discourse and possibility of action over issues increasingly 
considered as solely relevant to the judicial sphere. During the same period, a reform of the art. 
79 of the Italian Constitution, regulating amnesty and indulto, was being approved to restrict 
the use of clemency (law n.1/1992). Since 1992, amnesty and indulto laws are no longer a 
prerogative of the President of the Republic, on the delegation from the parliament agreed by 
simple majority vote, but are emanated by the Parliament, and require a two-thirds vote in each 
chamber and on each article of the law. This reform epitomises a self-limitation of political 
powers in their legitimacy and capacity to alter decisions of the judiciary and demonstrates the 
growing tendency of political forces ‘to delegate to the sole “sword of justice” the solution of 
many problems’ (Pavarini, 2013: 60, see also Fiandaca, 2013). The issue of political prisoners 
is in this sense rather paradigmatic as it exemplifies the depoliticisation of the crime problem 
and the judicialisation of politics: the loss of primacy and legitimacy of the political to define 
criminality, identify its causes and devise its solutions in the social and political field is 
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translated in the increasing ‘reliance on courts and judicial means for addressing core moral 
predicaments, public policy questions, and political controversies’ (Hirschl, 2008). 
 As Pavarini (1994; 2013) points out, the early 1990s are marked by growing moralism 
and social demand for repression in Italian society, under the simultaneous effect of political 
corruption scandals, the fight against the mafia, media emphasis on the drug problem, as well 
as the rise of judges as heroic figures. With the collapse of the old party-system and new 
conservative and populist forces appearing on the political scene, it was also a peculiar, and 
widespread cultural attitude to the crime question, ‘as an issue that to be solved by politics 
rather than by penal repression’ (Pavarini, 1994: 52) that gradually faded away. Consequently, 
measures of clemency became more politically costly in a period in which the political class 
was accused of excessive indulgence and immorality. Not only ‘higher levels of penality [were] 
socially invoked and institutionally legitimised’, (Pavarini, 2013: 60) but also lenience, 
forgiveness and clemency (for both political and common offenses) were concurrently 
delegitimised35. Whilst Italian penality has continued to be, in several aspects, Janus-faced, 
oscillating between punitiveness and moderation (Corda, 2016; Gallo, 2015; Nelken, 2005; 
Violante, 1997), the early 1990s mark the beginning of a ‘punitive turn’, visible in public 
discourses, legislations and penal practices, and of which the delegitimation and abandonment 
of clemency is one of the indicators (Corda, 2016). 
The failure to agree a measure of clemency for political crimes in this phase needs therefore to 
be resituated in this specific context of political and penal change, where the long-term 
reluctance of political actors to treat the armed struggle as a ‘political’ (rather than ‘criminal’) 
issue is coupled with the cautiousness dictated by historical contingencies.  
Between the search for truth and reconciliation and the rise of penal populism 
In 1993, in the immediate aftermath of the Clean Hands corruption scandal and in a 
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climate of great uncertainty for political parties, a bill for indulto for ‘terrorist crimes’ backed 
mainly by left-wing MPs36 was discussed and approved by the Parliament’s Justice 
Commission, but was never brought to the chambers due to early elections in 1994. Arguments 
in support echoed the ones used in previous debates: a consensus upon the end of terrorism and 
the necessity to rebalance the excesses of counter-terrorism. Some supporters of the proposal 
underlined that the intention was ‘not to deal with a historiographic problem’ but with ‘a 
question on extremely limited juridical considerations’37. The main promoter of the proposal, 
however, also encouraged to envisage pardon as an ‘act that could appease tensions and 
contribute to clarify events that are still obscure’.38 In 1992, the Parliamentary Investigation 
Committee on Terrorism in Italy had concluded the first round of investigations without any 
significant achievement in determining the political causes and wider responsibilities of the 
1970s’ violence, aims for which it had been established. In the 1990s, a new understanding of 
amnesties as instruments to close periods of conflicts, reconcile societies and help the ‘truth’ 
emerge, appeared in the discourse of some actors in Italy, looking at successful experiences in 
TJ settings in Africa, South America and other regions (Jeffery 2014; Teitel 2003). The 
example of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, was expressly invoked 
by two senators of opposed parties Giovanni Pellegrino (DS) and Alfredo Mantica (AN), both 
members of the Parliamentary investigation committee as one of the ‘possible solutions to 
come to terms once for all, with the past’. They suggested to ‘renounce to a retributive model 
of penal justice in favour of a system that would allow to retrace the events, and establish not 
only the responsibilities for the crimes, but also to historically contextualise them […] for the 
benefit of a historical memory shared by all Italians’ (Mantica & Pellegrino, 2000).  
The argument of coming to terms with the past was advanced by left-wing promoters 
of proposals for pardon especially in the late 1990s39, in a context perceived as favourable to 
reopen a public debate40 on a political ‘solution to a problem that is not only of criminal nature’. 
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Attempts to re-politicise and re-legitimise clemency as a political act with social and 
humanitarian aims were nevertheless strongly opposed by right-wing representatives wielding 
the respect of ‘the sorrows of victims and their expectations of justice’41, to justify the necessity 
‘even after many years, [for] rigour and severity’42. Their rhetorical emphasis on the rights of 
‘victims of terrorism’, constructed in a mutually exclusive opposition to the rights of 
‘terrorists’, and on the retributive significance of (harsh) punishment translates less a 
commitment to supporting the victims, than an instrumental use of crime and punishment for 
electoral purposes. It also epitomises, as indicated by Fiandaca (2013) and Fiorentino and 
Chiaramonte (2019: 159), the tendency to extend the prosecutorial logic and ‘model of 
leadership’ to politics (Simon, 2007: 37). The political actors and parties that entered the Italian 
Parliament from the mid-1990, against a background of corruption scandals, judicialisation and 
moralisation of politics, inaugurate a populist use of the criminal law and demagogic ‘law and 
order’ campaigns, that became the dominant feature of security politics and penal policies in 
the 2000s (Corda, 2016; Fiandaca, 2013; Pavarini 2013; Selmini, 2011; Wacquant, 1999).  
The parliamentary debates of the late 1990s thus illustrate the erosion of the political and social 
purposes of clemency by punitive registers: the strategic simplification and reduction of 
complex juridical issues related to the 1970s to a question of individual liability, retribution 
and ‘justice’ for the victims, obfuscated and delegitimised the concerns for rights, judicial 
equity and consideration of socio-political circumstances (Fiorentino & Chiaramonte, 2019; 
Fiandaca, 2013; Author, 2011). 
 
Punitiveness, political uses of the past and the disappearance of clemency 
Until the mid-2000s, proposals for indulto for politically motivated crimes continued 
to be presented before the Parliament by left-wing politicians, although in much fewer 
numbers, and quickly came to a dead end43. As argued by Rayner (2006), political actors tended 
 
 19 
to see the context as not favourable to the social and political acceptance of an amnesty of the 
‘years of lead’. The ‘terrorism emergency’ was reactivated at both international level – with 
the 9/11 attacks – and at domestic level, with the killing, in 1999 and 2001, of two lawyers 
working for the government to reform labour laws, by a new left-wing armed group, commonly 
called the ‘new Red Brigades’. 
It was in this context that extradition procedures against some former left-wing 
militants residing in France since the 1980s44 started. As a display of cooperation between two 
right-wing governments eager to demonstrate of ‘governing through security’, the politics of 
informal asylum – or ‘doctrine Mitterrand’ – that allowed several former militants to live in 
France, came to a sudden halt. Due to his reputation as a crime novelist and the mobilisation 
of French intellectuals against his extradition, the case of Cesare Battisti in 200445 received 
greater media coverage. The debates surrounding it symbolically crystallised, beyond the 
historiographical debates, the opposition between two rationales for punishment. The first, 
mainly represented by a group of French intellectuals and the Human Rights League (LDH), 
was supporting the suspension of Battisti’s extradition, on the ground that he had abandoned 
the armed struggle over twenty years earlier, formed a family, found a job and become a 
successful novelist. Punishment was therefore no longer making sense, for Battisti and others 
‘political refugees’, because resocialisation and renouncement to political violence were 
clearly demonstrated by their life in France. French calls for amnesty were met on the other 
side of the Alps by the retributive rationale that ‘culprits deserve to be punished’, substantiated 
by the emotive register of victims’ sorrow and need for ‘justice’. Italian responses to the affaire 
were mostly coming from anti-terrorism judges and Battisti’s alleged victims, which was 
symptomatic of both the historical role played by judges in the management of the armed 
struggle, and a more recent ‘prosecutorial complex’ characterised by an “increasing willingness 
by prosecutors to use the media and speak as a voice for the crime victims” and advocate for 
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tougher penal policies (Simon, 2007: 43). Judges interviewed in the press were not only 
defending the validity of their decisions and the emergency legislation, but also presented 
themselves as the embodiment of a professional expertise delegitimising Battisti’s French 
supporters as ‘laypeople’46, and ‘giving voice to real victims’ suffering and quests for justice’ 
(Fiandaca, 2013: 106; Author, 2007).  
Whilst the case revived the issue of amnesty, actual proposals and discussions in 
Parliament were only short-lived47. What emerged from the public and media debates on 
Battisti’s extradition was the persistent primacy of the judicial logic in the analysis of the 1970s 
and the political and media use of ‘victims of terrorism’ that disavowed any potential political, 
social and historical consideration. The existence of a socio-political context more favourable 
to the recognition of victims’ traumas and claims (Fassin & Rechtman, 2009) was particularly 
visible in Italy regarding the ‘victims of terrorism’ of the 1970s48. The main associations 
(founded in the 1980s) became more active and visible at national level in the 2000s, along 
with the creation numerous other associations and memory centres. Political actors also showed 
a greater willingness to endorse their claims: two important laws were passed in 2004 and 2007 
in support of victims of the ‘years of lead’, to provide financial assistance (law 206/2004) and 
to establish the ‘Day of remembrance dedicated to victims of terrorism and bombings of such 
origin (law 56/2007)’. Whilst institutional support to victims and their families was long 
overdue, right-wing politicians, activists and commentators routinely invoked their feelings 
and interests to oppose clemency and promote a punitive discourse denouncing supposedly 
lenient CJ policies benefiting ‘terrorists’ at the expense of their victims (Garland, 2001; Pratt, 
2007; Simon, 2007). Over the past two decades, not only did right-wing politicians and activists 
oppose clemency proposals, but also staged several protests in occasion of release on parole of 
former militants or participation to public talks of former militants who had already, since long, 
served their sentence49. Their successful resocialisation or their release, even after over twenty 
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years in prison, were portrayed and denounced as a scandal, a ‘moral harm’ to victims, or the 
sign of excessive leniency of the penal system. These orchestrated expressions of reprobation 
and public shaming can be assimilated to forms of extra-legal punishment (Fassin, 2017) that 
feed the punitive narrative and exemplify the extension of the prosecutorial complex to political 
action (Fiandaca, 2013). 
The disappearance of proposals for amnesty in this third phase therefore is not the result of 
lassitude towards the issue of the 1970s’ armed struggle, but rather the product of a series of 
historical and political dynamics that have led to its increased political instrumentalisation. The 
penal treatment of former militants has become indeed one of the fields where right-wing 
populist parties have deployed their ‘tough on crime’ arsenal to gain political votes. 
As stated earlier, the singularity of the 1970s in Italy lays in the fact that the decade 
escapes a clear and narrow definition in terms of ‘conflict’ or ‘criminality’ and sits into a 
controversial in-between. As such, the penal treatment of individuals convicted for politically 
motivated offences during the 1970s was influenced by political and penal changes occurring 
at national level from the 1990s, and by the spreading of a new ‘penal doxa’ (Wacquant, 1999) 
emphasising individual responsibility and dismissing collective causes as ‘excuses’. A similar 
narrative is observable in transitional contexts, where the choice of criminal prosecution and 
individual punishment increasingly prevail over non-judicial reconciliation mechanisms (Lessa 
and Payne, 2012; Jeffery, 2014; Lutz and Sikkink, 2001; Sriram, 2003). Over the recent years, 
amnesties have been ‘too easily dismissed as the absence of accountability, the very 
embodiment of impunity’ (Mallinder and McEvoy, 2011: 109), delegitimised by a prevailing 
anti-impunity position (Freeman and Pensky, 2012, Pensky, 2007) and presented as a second 
injustice done to victims (Pensky, 2007). Developments in international criminal law point to 
the same direction50 and testify of changing attitudes towards the capacity and necessity of CJ 
to establish historical truths and responsibilities for past violence. 
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The case of the ‘years of lead’ in Italy is useful in this perspective, as it illustrates the 
limitations and effects of individual criminal accountability to address the legacy of collective 
violence, in contexts considered as democratic, and therefore in absence of regime 
discontinuity and formal TJ mechanisms. The absence of amnesty and the judicialisation of the 
‘armed struggle’ in Italy has structured and exacerbated, rather than dissolved, the tension 
between ‘truth’ and ‘justice’, criminal accountability and political responsibilities, as it failed 
to produce, or even precluded the possibility for, a comprehensive account of what happened, 
how and why. While in post-conflict and post-authoritarian societies amnesties tend to 
decriminalise acts of the powerful, in Italy it would apply to former activists and encourage a 
reconsideration of the state’s responsibilities. In this sense, the long withholding of amnesty 
acted as a veil of impunity for the powerful, for it pinned the criminal responsibility of violence 
on a handful of individuals, shielded the state from accountability and thus foreclosed the 
possibility of examining the deeper roots of a decade of social and political unrest. 
 
Conclusion 
This article developed a socio-historical analysis of the debates about measures of 
clemency (amnesty, indulto, dissociation) for politically motivated offences committed during 
the 1970s in Italy and identified three successive phases. In the first phase, in the immediate 
aftermath of the ‘end of terrorism’ in the early 1980s, political and judicial approaches were 
marked by a vigorous punitive response, that nevertheless coexisted with selective leniency 
and relative openness to the possibility of clemency. During the second phase, from the late 
1980s to the mid-1990s, proposals for amnesty and pardon gradually lost support, delegitimised 
both as tools of penal management for common offences and as mechanism to deal with the 
past, in a period of transformation of the political field and growing judicial and penal 
populism. During the third phase, from the end of the 1990s and more markedly in the 2000s, 
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the discourse around political prisoners shifted towards a more punitive register, that served 
the political interests of right-wing populist actors.  
Often ascribed to long-lasting political divides and the ‘extra-ordinary’ character of the 
‘years of lead’, the trajectory of the failed amnesty of convicted militants was here re-inscribed 
into the recent history of Italian ‘ordinary’ penality. This enabled to show that although debates 
on amnesty have always been entrenched in controversies about the historical and political 
evaluation of the 1970s, the penal treatment of former militants has changed over time and 
adjusted to newer punitive rhetoric and thrusts. In the 2000s, an amnesty is politically no longer 
justified or justifiable, not because the ‘years of lead’ are an ‘old’, supposedly ‘dealt with’, 
issue, but rather because clemency does not fit into the new ‘law and order’ agenda and 
retributivist narrative. The mise en scène of the arrest of Cesare Battisti at the Rome airport in 
January 2019, in presence of armed police forces and both the Minister of the Interior Matteo 
Salvini (League) and the Justice Secretary Bonafede (Cinque Stelle) and broadcasted on TV 
and social media, perfectly exemplifies the entanglement of more recent forms of penal 
populism with the political instrumentalisation of the 1970s. Hence, the amnesty of the ‘years 
of lead’ has been eschewed by the intertwined transformation of the political and the penal in 
Italy since the 1990s. By resituating the failed amnesty of the ‘years of lead’ in this wider 
context of declining legitimacy and salience of clemency measures as political tools with social 
and humanitarian aims, this case also provides a singular insight into the ways in which global 
penal trends and punitive discourses take root in specific socio-political contexts and come to 
override and reshape (long-term) debates. 
Finally, this case study demonstrates that the absence of an amnesty in hybrid 
conflict/non-conflict contexts of regime continuity, has created the conditions for the 
perpetuation of socio-historical, political and judicial controversies of the past into the present, 
with significant punitive outcomes for individual non-state actors and oblivion of socio-
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political circumstances. The reliance on criminal law and punishment, including at 
international level, to manage social and political problems leads to insulate the (criminal) act 
from the social and historical context that made it possible, confound the perpetrator with the 
causes, and therefore devise solutions of limited social effectiveness. A fortiori, clemency 
measures retain the potential to reaffirm the legitimacy of the political to define problems and 
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40 Toni Negri was arrested and incarcerated on his return to Italy in 1997. The same year, trials against Adriano 
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for complicity in the murder of a police official in 1972.  
41 Commissione Affari Costituzionali, 9 September 1997. Available from: 
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